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Congressional Investigations:
A Plan for Legislative Review
by Frank E. Horack, Jr. • Professor of Law at Indiana University School of Law
m As Lloyd K. Garrison pointed out in an article in last month's Journal, congres-
sional investigations have served the country well and we could not do without
them, while at the same time some of them occasionally develop excesses which
cause their friends both in and out of Congress much concern. Mr. Garrison's
article offered some suggestions for getting off the horns of the dilemma; Pro-
fessor Horack offers here his own suggestion for solving the problem: a Committee
in each house of Congress to review witnesses' claims of exemption from giving
testimony.
m Although the great majority of
congressional hearings and investi-
gations are conducted with fairness
and decorum, a few committees have
placed in jeopardy the reputations,
dignity and constitutional rights of
many persons who have been sum-
moned as witnesses. As a conse-
quence, there has been an insistent
demand for limiting the jurisdiction
of committee investigations and re-
viewing the fairness of committee
procedure. Some critics have looked
to the courts for a revitalization of
Kilbourn v. Thompson1 and others
have proposed enactment of uniform
rules for congressional committee
procedure.2 Neither approach offers
a complete solution.
Two propositions are self-evident:
witnesses should be protected from
"fishing expeditions", inquiry into
purely private affairs and from en-
forced testimony which might in
criminate; the Government should
have the full knowledge, testimony
and opinion of all its citizens con-
cerning matters of great national im-
port.3 Only with the aid of the citi-
zens may Congress discharge what
Woodrow Wilson described as the
duty "to look diligently into every
affair of government and to talk
much about what it sees". 4 And if
Congress is intended to be the watch-
dog for the people and "the inform-
ing function of Congress should be
preferred even to its legislative func-
tion",5 then Congress, not the courts,
should determine the limits of
its jurisdiction when constitutional
guarantees are not involved.
Until recently, the judiciary has
respected and reflected Wilson's view
and has been reluctant to interfere
with the investigating process, for,
as Judge Holtzoff observed, "While
the power of Congress to carry on
investigations is not without limit,
nevertheless the Congress has broad
discretion in determining the subject
matter of the study and the scope and
extent of the inquiry. If the subject
under scrutiny may have any possible
relevance and materiality, no matter
how remote, to some possible legisla-
tion, it is within the power of the
Congress to investigate the matter.
Moreover, the relevance and mate-
riality of the subject matter must be
presumed. . . . It would be intoler-
able if the judiciary were to intrude
into the legislative branch of the
Government and virtually stop the
process of investigation."0
The Supreme Court, however,
underltook judicial review of con-
gressional committee procedure in
Christoflel v. United States7 even
though it soon chose to abandon the
experiment in United States v. Bry
-
an.s But late in the last term, in
United States v. Rumely9 the Court
more boldly restrained committee in-
quiry even though the decision rested
upon the shifting sands of inconclu-
sive statutory construction.' 0 Never-
theless, the recent decisions stand as
an unmasked warning to congression-
al committees and will invite further
I. 103 U.S. 168 [1880).
2. Most of the proposals have been collected
in Glossle and Cooley, "Congressional Investiga-
tions-Slvation in Self-Regulation", 38 Geo. L. J.
343 (1950); see also, "Symposium-Congressional
Investigations", 18 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 421-686
(1951); Wyzanski, "Standards of Congressional
Investigations", 3 Record 93 (1947).
3, Landis, "Constitutional Limitations on the
Congressional Power of Investigation", 40 Harv.
f. Rev. 153 (1926).
4, Wilson, Congressiona Government 303.
5. ibid.
6. United States v. Bryan, 72 F, Supp. 58 11947).
7. 338 U.S. 84 (19491.
8, 339 U.S. 323 (1950),
9, 73 S. Ct. 543 (1953),
10. The resolution authorized the committee to
investigate "lobbying activities". A subpoena
issued to procure information concerning "indirect
lobbying" was held beyond the jurisdiction of the
committee because dictionary definitions of lobby-
ing were retrictud to "direct lobbying".
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challenges to committee power.
Whether the challenges are meritori-
ous or not, the congressional ability
to discharge its informing function
has been seriously encumbered.
The protection of civil rights, of
admitted concern throughout these
litigations and certainly of the high-
est value in our constitutional system,
does not require judicial review of
internal congressional procedure nor
jurisdictional limitation on commit-
tee inquiry. Judicial review will not
only result in a reduction in the
power of Congress but also in a de-
cline in congressional responsibility.
And the courts' inquiry cannot be
easily confined to the cases of "legis-
lative" investigations: no logical
boundary separates investigation of
the administration of the Govern-
ment, investigation under the treaty
power, impeachments, confirmations
of appointments, and even member-
discipline and the review of elections.
Judicial review of all these diverse
subjects would present many em-
barrassing political questions and a
gradual withdrawal of judicial re-
view similar to that which followed




Thus, the great majority of writers
have opposed an expansion of judi-
cial review and argue that Congress
should assume full responsibility for
supervising committee action by en-
acting uniform rules of procedure
binding upon all standing and select
committees. The adoption of uni-
form rules may contribute to an im-
provement in committee procedure,
but basically they suffer from three
weaknesses: (1) Different committees
have widely differing responsibilities
and thus a sensible rule for one may
be utter folly for another. (2) The
enactment of uniform rules is no
guarantee that the committees will
comply. Good committees can make
good rules, but good rules cannot
make good committees. And (3) they
provide no sanctions for their en-
forcement.
The real need is for a system of
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legislative review to enforce uniform
rules and insure fairness and re-
sponsibility of investigations. Theo-
retically, this is possible now by any
member of the House moving to
rescind the committee's authority or
to confine it by restrictive amend-
ment, but politically it is impossible.
The only way the issue reaches the
floor of the House is for a witness to
refuse to testify and for the com-
mittee to seek a resolution from the
House for his prosecution either be-
fore the bar of the House or in the
federal courts.
When the issue is raised in this
manner it does not present the ques-
tion of whether the committee has
exceeded its authority or whether
the questions have been relevant and
material, but whether the chairman
of the committee is entitled to a vote
of confidence from his party and
from the House. The witness is un-
represented and his cause is soon
forgotten. Congressmen who pri-
vately condemn the actions of the
committee feel compelled to vote in
support of the committee because
the party leadership insists that a
vote of confidence is essential to
maintain the party position, and in-
dividual members, regardless of the
merits of the particular controversy,
feel that a negative vote would jeop-
ardize their own positions as com-
mittee chairmen. Uniform rules will
not repeal congressional courtesy.
The philosophy of McGrain v.
Daugherty12 can be maintained and
judicial review avoided if the Houses
establish a system of legislative re-
view. The proposal would permit a
witness to challenge the authority of
an investigating committee by an
appeal to a review committee ap-
pointed by the House. The commit-
tee should be bipartisan in character,
composed of three members from
each major political party. The mem-
bers should be selected from the law-
yer members and should have exten-
sive legislative experience and be
held in high personal and profes-
sional respect by both sides of the
House. In addition to the six mem-
bers there should be a panel of alter-
nates from which members can be
selected in case an appeal is taken
from a committee which includes a
review committee member.13
A committee witness should not be
permitted to challenge the sufficiency
of the subpoena before the review
committee prior to his appearance
before the investigating committee,
for the presumption should be in
favor of the propriety of the in-
quiry and the witness' obligation to
provide information to the Gov-
ernment. After appearance, however,
the witness should be able to chal-
lenge the propriety of specific ques
tions on the ground that (1) the
inquiry is beyond the jurisdiction
conferred by the House resolution or
the terms of the subpoena, (2) the
question is not material or relevant
to the inquiry,14 or (3) the question
invades the witness' constitutional
rights. Challenge of committee au-
thority would be raised as it is now
by the witness' refusing to answer.
In addition, the witness would be
required to indicate his intent to
appeal to the review committee.
Thereafter, the investigating com-
mittee could not seek a resolution
authorizing prosecution for contempt
until after the review committee
handed down its decision.
The witness would be obligated to
notify the review committee of an
appeal by the second day following
the day on which the question was
asked.15 The appeal would be on the
record, that is, a verified copy of the
resolution authorizing the inquiry,
the subpoena, if one had been used,
and the verbatim transcript of the
pertinent questions asked by the
committee. In order to prevent delay
and discursive dilatory tactics, the
committee should have the right to
ask all questions which it considered
pertinent to its inquiry and the wit-
11. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
12. 273 U.S. 135 (1926).
13. Admittedly, personnel of this caliber will
be already overburdened with responsibility, but
with staff-aides of Supreme Court clerk ability,
they should be able to discharge these additional
obligations.
14. On legislative review, the issue of muteriality
and relevance should be much broader than in
judicial review. See, infra page 194.
15. When the investignting committee is holding
hearings outside of Washington, the time for
notifying would, of course, have to be lengthened.
Congressional Investigations
ness should be obligated to raise all
his objections at one time so that
the entire matter might be dis-
posed of on one appeal. 16
in support of the appeal, the wit-
ness and the committee should be
permitted to file written briefs, inas-
much as the matter in controversy
usually will be known to the witness
and the committee in advance of the
hearing, a ten-day briefing period
should be sufficient. In cases of un-
usual difficulty the review commit-
tee, in the same manner as a court,
should have the power to extend the
time for filing. Reply briefs and oral
argument should be discouraged but
not prohibited. The psychological
advantage of assuring the witness
that his case has actually been heard
by the review committee should out-
weigh the burdens which oral argu-
ments impose on the review comit-
tee and the delays to the conduct of
the investigation.
Within as short a period as possible
after the conclusion of arguments
the review committee should be obli-
gated to render its decision, in order
that the investigation may proceed
if the decision is favorable to the
committee, and that the witness'
position may be speedily confirmed if
the decision is against the committee.
The decision of the review committee
should be accompanied by a written
opinion. Copies of the opinion
should be available immediately to
the witness and to the committee,
and in order that a body of prece-
dents may be developed the opinions
should ultimately be printed and
published.
It Is To Be Hoped That Few Witnesses
Would Remain Recusant
If the decision of the review commit-
tee sustains the investigating com-
mittee, the witness could be recalled
under the original subpoena merely
by informing the witness of a new
date set for the hearing. If the wit-
ness continued recusant, the coin-
mittee could then move for a house
resolution authorizing prosecution
for contempt. Although the vote on
this motion would in effect amount
to a reconsideration by the whole
House of the review committee's
decision, unless there had been a
vigorous dissent by a review com-
mittee member the adoption of the
resolution would be in most instances
automatic. It is to be hoped, of
course, that in these circumstances
few witnesses would remain recusant.
If the review committee proceeds in
an impartial and judicial manner,
courts should give great weight to
its determinations particularly where
they relate to matters of jurisdiction
or internal committee procedure.
Witnesses should, therefore, be less
successful in their judicial appeals
and should conclude that the ex-
penditure of time and money will
gain them little.17
Conversely, if the decision is
against the investigating committee,
the witness should not only feel vin-
dicated but should also be protected
against further harassment. Congress
in the enabling legislation could
grant complete finality to the deci-
sion, i.e., make a subsequent resolu-
tion based on the matter at issue out
of order, place the members of the
committee in contempt if they pro-
cccded with the questions, or make a
continuation of the inquiry grounds
for the withdrawal of the committee's
authority. The severity of these sanc-
tions and the fact that enforcement
would raise a political question for
the entire membership to decide
argues against complete finality to
the review committee's decision. Fur-
thermore, formal abdication of the
authority of the house is not in
keeping with legislative practice.
A second possibility would be to
give finality to the decision unless it
was appealed by the investigating
committee for reconsideration by the
whole house. This appears to be a
needless step and tends to reintro-
duce political considerations which
the review procedure seeks to elimi-
nate. A better procedure would per-
mit the decision to be attacked col-
laterally.
Under this third proposal, if, after
an adverse decision, the investigating
committee recalls the witness and
the witness again refuses to answer,
the committee may seek a resolution
Frank E. Horack, Jr., has been a pro-
fessor of law at Indiana University since
1935. A graduate of the University of
Iowa, he was admitted to the Iowa Bar
in 1929. He is the author of a number of
books and law review articles.
authorizing a prosecution for con-
tempt. In effect this action challenges
the decision of the review committee
not in an abstract way, as in the sec-
ond situation, but within the frame-
work of an actual litigation. Pre-
sumptively, the decision of the review
committee, because it is rendered by
an impartial tribunal not concerned
with the inquiry, should prevail. The
house will be aware that a court
would more likely, in deciding a con-
tempt prosecution, follow the deci-
sion of tIre independent committee
than of the prosecuting committee;
therefore, the house, when it must
choose between the decisions of the
two committees, is likely to accept
the review committee's verdict.
Perhaps the greatest merit to the
procedure is that it keeps the issues
narrow and balances political pres-
sures. The issue will not be: Should
we support our appointed committee
against the attack of a nonmember?
16. This does not imply, however, that after a
notice to the review committee has been issued,
the hearing committee cannot withdraw the ques-
tion or the witness indicate his willingness to
answer thereby making the appeal moot.
17. It is conceivable, if the legislative review
proved to be a highly reliable process, that wit-
nesses ofter an adverse decision by the review
committee might more frequently receive maximum
fines and imprisonment upon their conviction in
court.
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or, Will an adverse vote injure the
political position of the majority
party? The issue framed under this
proposal will be: Which of two com-
mittees has more accurately deter-
mined the propriety of a particular
question asked of a particular wit-
ness under a specific resolution au-
thorizing an inquiry? On such a
question, reasonable men admittedly
may differ, but the decision of the
house is now more easily confined
to the merits of the question and the
political pressures are now balanced,
for the decision of one committee
must be sustained and the decision
of the other must be reversed.
There are other advantages of leg-
islative review. When the question is
decided judicially, concepts of sepa-
ration of powers and intergovern-
mental relations must be considered
by the court. Is it wise and proper,
therefore, for the court to review the
internal workings of a legislative
committee unless compelled by con-
stitutional direction? If the court
interferes will it encourage witnesses,
without cause, to delay investigations
necessary to the national security
and welfare? If the court refuses to
interfere, will this be interpreted by
congressional committees as carte
blanche authority to proceed without
restraint? These questions need not
perturb the legislative review com-
mittee. They are a part of the legis-
lative process and may police the
committees with a view to maintain-
ing the reliability and insuring the
public respect and confidence in the
fairness and impartiality of legisla-
tive investigations.
When a court decides issues of
"relevancy and materiality" it must
limit its decisions to jurisdictional
constitutional questions. The legisla-
tive review committee, however, can
consider not only the jurisdictional
and constitutional questions but also
the import of specific questions on
the total conduct of the hearing. If,
for example, the house adopts rules
for the governance of committee
hearings and investigations similar
to those which have been proposed,18
the review committee could restrain
the investigating committee from
asking questions concerning personal
and private belief, from inquiring
into matters adversely affecting repu-
tation without insuring the witness
the opportunity of filing a sworn
statement in refutation, or from re-
quiring testimony without the pres-
ence of counsel. These are but a few
of the safeguards suggested in the
uniform rules, but practically all of
them are susceptible to better en-
forcement by the legislative review
committee than by the courts.
Courts Cannot Easily Protect
Congressional Witnesses
The courts have no convenient way
by which to restrain a committee
from establishing "guilt by associa-
tion", from disparaging and "con-
victing" unfriendly witnesses or from
releasing partial and misleading
transcripts of evidence. Legislative
review, however, could properly pro-
vide this type of supervision. The
house, through the review commit-
tee, could protect its own record and
maintain proper responsibility to its
constituents.
Decisions of this character are ad-
mittedly difficult to make and for
obvious reasons no legislator would
make them voluntarily. Thus, a legis-
lative procedure which requires the
witness to raise the issue and imposes
by statute the duty of deciding on
the review committee, not only ap-
peals to the lawyers' respect for re-
view procedure, but also is politically
attractive because the review con-
itittee is not required to take the
initiative and the membership of
the house need not xote on broad
and inarticulate political issues. Each
decision, as at common law, will be
trade on the narrow facts of the par-
ticular case.
This procedure offers advantages
both to the witness and to the govern-
ment. The witness can get an early
determination of his case with a
lesser expenditure of time and mon-
ey. This is not an inconsequential
advantage, for the risk of criminal
prosecution with all its implications
and insinuations has no doubt forced
more than one witness to testify when
he was in fact privileged.
The advantages to Congress will
also be great. The four or five years'
delay required by the current method
of prosecution for contempt will be
eliminated in the majority of cases.
The Government, if it is entitled to
it, will have the advantage of impor
tant testimony when it needs it most.
T he spectacle of a willful witness
stopping the machinery of govern-
ment should become rare, for if
legislative review is impartial and
competent, such a witness can foresee
slight chance of acquittal if the re-
view committee decides adversely in
his case. Conversely, legislative ie-
view should insure fairer treatment
of all witnesses and to that extent
most witnesses should be willing to
testify more freely. Finally, the in-
vestigating function should be made
a responsible process and thereby be
relieved of the charges of bias and
prejudice.
Admittedly, legislative review will
cause an initial increase in the num-
ber of cases, but if the procedure is
well administered the increase will
be temporary. Soon the investigating
committees will recognize the limits
of their own power, and witnesses
will learn that spurious objections
will not be sustained. Ultimately,
only the meritorious borderline cases
where reasonable men differ will be
litigated.
Legislative review will fill the
hiatus between unenforceable rules
of committee procedure and undesir-
able judicial intervention in the
legislative process.
18. See supro, note 2.
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